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Portfolio Manager Ownership and Mutual Fund Risk Taking* 
 
Linlin Ma† and Yuehua Tang‡ 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper studies the effect of portfolio manager ownership (i.e., skin in the game) on mutual 
fund risk taking. Using holdings-based risk change measures that capture managers’ ex ante risk 
choices, we find that portfolio manager ownership reduces both intra-year and across-year risk-
taking activities. The relation between ownership and risk reduction is particularly strong among 
managers with high agency-issue-induced risk-taking incentives, e.g., managers who face a more 
convex flow-performance relation, have poor past performance, or are not compensated based on 
long-term fund performance. Funds with greater managerial ownership are also associated with 
lower levels of total risk and downside risk. Overall, portfolio manager ownership serves as an 
incentive alignment mechanism and has important implications for mutual fund investors.  
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Mutual funds are professionally managed investment vehicles that are designed to meet 
specific risk-return needs of investors. In theory, mutual fund managers should determine the 
portfolio risk solely based on investors’ risk preferences and return expectations. In practice, 
fund managers may alter portfolio risk based on their own utility functions. This fosters a classic 
agency problem. In this paper, we examine how portfolio manager ownership, that is, “skin in 
the game”, affects mutual fund risk-taking behavior. In particular, the main objective of our study 
is to analyze how managerial ownership affects changes in fund risk taking, especially agency-
issue-induced risk changes. 
It has been well documented that mutual fund flows respond strongly to recent superior 
performance, but are much less sensitive to poor performance (e.g., Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; 
Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Huang, Wei, and Yan, 2007). This convex flow-performance relation can 
give rise to agency conflicts between managers and investors as it creates incentives for 
managers to engage in excess risk-taking behavior.1 Such agency-issue-motivated risk taking can 
be detrimental to fund performance and imposes large costs on fund investors (Huang, Sialm, 
and Zhang (2011)). Managerial ownership is an important mechanism to mitigate agency 
conflicts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Portfolio managers can use co-investment to signal that 
their interests are closely aligned with those of shareholders (Leland and Pyle, 1977). 2  By 
investing their personal wealth in the funds they manage, portfolio managers must share the 
downside risk with the investors. Hence, managerial ownership can reduce the convexity of the 
option-like reward structures and dampens the sensitivity of changes of risk taking to agency-
induced risk-taking incentives. We therefore expect that ceteris paribus, greater managerial 
                                                        
1 See, among others, Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Koski and Pontiff (1999), 
Busse (2001), Basak, Payloya, and Shapiro (2007), Kempf and Ruenzi (2008), Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele (2009), 
Hu, Kale, Pagani, and Subramanian (2011), and Schwarz (2012).  
2 It is mostly managers’ personal portfolio decision to invest in the funds they manage (Khorana, Servaes, and 
Wedge, 2007). By co-investing, portfolio managers tie their human capital, future earnings, and personal wealth to 
the funds they manage and thus bear the costs of under-diversification.   
2 
 
ownership is associated with lower changes in fund risk taking, and this is especially true when 
agency-issue-induced risk-taking incentives are strong.  
Portfolio manager ownership may affect not only the change in fund risk but also the level 
of fund risk. Both these effects are primarily due to agency conflicts inherent in any principal-
agent relationship. While the former effect comes through the channel of convex reward 
incentives as discussed above, the latter effect could come through the channel of managerial risk 
aversion. For example, the risk aversion of the manager may different from that of the investors. 
Ownership increases the sensitivity of managers’ wealth to fund performance, which could lead 
to lower level of fund risk if portfolio managers are risk averse. As a result, we also expect a 
negative relation between managerial ownership and the level of fund risk.  
We manually collect data on portfolio manager ownership for a sample of 1,610 actively-
managed U.S. domestic equity mutual funds over the period 2007–2014. Starting in 2005, the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires mutual funds to disclose portfolio 
managers’ ownership stakes in the fund using the following seven ranges: $0, $1–$10,000, 
$10,001–50,000, $50,001–$100,000, $100,001–$500,000, $500,001–$1,000,000, and above 
$1,000,000. Following Khorana, Servaes, and Wedge (2007), we convert the dollar ranges into 
dollar amounts by assuming managerial ownership to be at the midpoint of the reported intervals. 
We find that about 70% of our sample funds have at least one manager co-investing in the fund, 
with an average stake of about $540,000. 
We first examine the relation between managerial ownership and changes in fund risk 
taking. To better capture managers’ ex ante risk choices in response to the incentives they face, 
we use mutual fund holdings to construct two measures that capture managers’ intended changes 
in portfolio risk, rather than changes in realized risk. 3  The first measure Across-Year Risk 
Change is constructed based on Huang, Sialm, and Zhang (2011). It is calculated as the annual 
                                                        
3 The realized risk levels, which are often computed using fund return data, can deviate substantially from manager’s 
intended risk taking due to unexpected changes in portfolio risk from exogenous market conditions (e.g., Kempf, 
Ruenzi, and Thiele, 2009; Huang, Sialm, and Zhang, 2011).  
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average of the difference between the intended volatility of the most recently disclosed fund 
holdings and the volatility of the fund’s actual returns, both estimated over the prior 52 weeks. 
The second measure Intra-Year Risk Change is based on Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele (2009). It is 
calculated as the difference between the intended risk in the second half of the year and the 
realized portfolio risk in the first half of the year. Both measures have positive (negative) values 
if the managers intend to increase (decrease) portfolio risk. 
We find both Across-Year Risk Change and Intra-Year Risk Change measures decrease as 
managerial ownership increases. That is, portfolio managers with greater ownership stakes in 
their own funds, ceteris paribus, are associated with greater reduction in risk taking in the 
subsequent year. The risk-reduction effect of ownership is economically significant. For instance, 
Across-Year Risk Change (Intra-Year Risk Change) of funds with managerial ownership is 0.31% 
(0.36%) lower than that of those without ownership. Given that the sample average of Across-
Year Risk Change (Intra-Year Risk Change) is 0.30% (0.58%), this effect is considerable. 
Furthermore, a one-standard-deviation increase in the dollar amount of managerial ownership is 
associated with a 9.7% (7.8%) standard deviation decrease in the Across-Year (Intra-Year) Risk 
Change measure. These findings support the idea that managerial ownership reduces risk taking 
of portfolio managers. Further investigation shows that managerial ownership mitigates intended 
increases in portfolio risk, rather than incentivizes intended decreases in portfolio risk. 
Next, we examine the channel through which managerial ownership reduces fund risk taking 
and examine whether the risk reduction effect of ownership is greater among managers with 
stronger agency-issue-induced risk-taking incentives. In our main analysis, we use two proxies to 
capture such risk-taking incentives: (i) convexity of the fund’s flow-performance relation, and 
(ii) fund past performance. Managers’ agency-induced risk-taking incentives are high when (i) 
they face a convex flow-performance relation (e.g., Chevalier and Ellison, 1997)), and (ii) when 
they are underperforming (e.g., Brown, Harlow, and Starks, 1996). Our results show that the 
effect of ownership on risk reduction is greater when managers face a more convex flow-
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performance relation, or when managers have been performing poorly. Moreover, we find the 
negative relation between ownership and risk changes is stronger when portfolio managers are 
not compensated based on long-term fund performance by the fund advisor, or when managers 
have shorter tenure in the mutual fund industry. All these findings suggest that the main 
mechanism of ownership’s impact on risk reduction is through mitigating managers’ agency-
induced risk-taking behavior. 
We conduct a series of additional tests to verify the robustness of our baseline results as well 
as the interaction effect of managerial ownership and risk-taking incentives. First, our results are 
robust to various alternative ways of measuring portfolio manager ownership. Second, we obtain 
similar results estimating the regressions with portfolio manager fixed effects, which suggests 
our results are unlikely to be driven by some unobservable portfolio manager characteristics. 
Finally, our results remain unchanged if we include family fixed effects, excluding the possibility 
that our results are driven by different family policies regarding portfolio manager ownership.  
Our last set of tests examines how managerial ownership affects the level of fund risk 
exposures. Our hypothesis is that a negative relation between ownership and the level of fund 
risk could arise due to managerial risk aversion. Specifically, we analyze the relation between 
managerial ownership and three measures of fund risk: (i) total risk (i.e., standard deviation of 
fund returns); (ii) market beta, and (iii) downside beta. We find that funds with greater manager 
co-investment are associated with significantly lower levels of total risk, systematic risk, and 
downside risk. This evidence corroborates our earlier conjectures that portfolio manager 
ownership relates to not only greater reduction in agency-induced risk taking, but also lower 
level of fund’s risk exposures. 
 Our study is related to several strands of research. First, we contribute to the broad literature 
on managerial risk taking in the mutual fund industry. Many previous studies suggest that 
implicit incentives from the convex flow-performance relation can induce funds to engage in 
excess risk-taking behavior (see footnote 1). In addition, recent empirical evidence shows that 
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excess risk-taking behavior has a negative impact on fund performance and can impose costs on 
fund investors (Huang, Sialm, and Zhang, 2011). Our paper contributes to this strand of literature 
by being the first to examine how portfolio manager ownership, i.e., “skin in the game”, affects 
mutual fund risk taking. Our study shows that managerial ownership can serve as an incentive 
alignment mechanism by mitigating managers’ agency-issue-induced risk-taking activities. 
Given that investors care about fund risk and risk-taking behavior that can be detrimental to fund 
performance, our study has important implications for mutual fund investors.  
Moreover, our paper complements earlier studies on portfolio manager ownership by 
Khorana, Servaes, and Wedge (2007), Evans (2008), and Fu and Wedge (2011). In particular, 
Khorana, Servaes, and Wedge (2007) use ownership data in 2004 and show that portfolio 
manager ownership is associated with better performance. We use a more comprehensive sample 
over the period of 2007–2014 and examine the impact of managerial ownership on risk taking. 
Khorana, Servaes, and Wedge (2007) offer limited evidence on the source of the relation between 
ownership and fund performance. That is, their finding could be driven by managers having 
superior information about their future performance or ownership better aligning the incentives 
of managers. Our study offers strong evidence that supports the latter channel. 
Our study is also broadly related to previous studies on mutual fund director ownership (e.g., 
Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2008; Cremers et al., 2009). Different from these studies that analyze 
directors’ incentives, we study the incentives of portfolio managers of U.S. mutual funds. While 
the primary responsibility of mutual fund directors is to review fund investors’ advisory fee 
contract with the fund management company, portfolio managers are the ones that make the day-
to-day investment decisions. Therefore, we believe our study on the effect of the actual decision 
makers’ ownership can be more direct and relevant, providing new insight into the incentive 
alignment mechanism in the mutual fund industry. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data, variable 
construction, and descriptive statistics. Section 3 analyzes the impact of managerial ownership 
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on changes in mutual fund risk taking. Section 4 studies the channel through which ownership 
relates to risk reduction. Section 5 analyzes the relation between managerial ownership and 
fund’s overall risk exposure. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Data, Variables, and Descriptive Statistics  
2.1 Data 
We construct our sample from several data sources. The first data source is Morningstar 
Direct Mutual Fund (MDMF) survivorship-bias-free database, which covers U.S. open-end 
mutual funds and contains information on fund names, fund tickers, fund CUSIPs, fund net-of-
fee returns, total net assets (TNA), inception dates, expense ratios, turnover ratios, portfolio 
manager names, manager biographical information, fund family names, and other fund 
characteristics.  
Our sample consists of actively managed U.S. domestic equity funds in the MDMF database 
over the period 2007–2014.4 We exclude money market funds, bond funds, balanced funds, 
international funds, and fund of funds from the sample. We identify and exclude index funds 
using fund names and index fund indicators.5 Following Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2001), Chen, 
Hong, Huang, Kubik (2004), and Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2015), we exclude funds with 
less than $15 million in TNA.6 To address the incubation bias documented in Evans (2010), we 
drop the first three years of return history for every fund in our sample. Since multiple share 
classes are listed separately in the MDMF database, we aggregate the share-class level data to the 
                                                        
4 Recent studies by Berk and van Binsbergen (2015) and Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2015) find that certain 
discrepancies exist in the data between Morningstar and CRSP mutual fund databases. To ensure data accuracy, we 
retain only the sample of funds in the Morningstar and CRSP merged database of Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor 
(2015). We thank Lubos Pastor, Robert Stambaugh, and Luke Taylor for sharing the CRSP and Morningstar merged 
mutual fund data.  
5 Similar to Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2015), we remove funds with Morningstar index fund indicator equal 
“Yes” or CRSP index fund flag equal to “D” (pure index fund) or “E” (enhanced index fund). We also exclude from 
our sample funds whose names contain any of the following text strings: Index, Ind, Idx, Indx, Mkt, Market, 
Composite, S&P, SP, Russell, Nasdaq, DJ, Dow, Jones, Wilshire, NYSE, iShares, SPDR, HOLDRs, ETF, Exchange-
Traded Fund, PowerShares, StreetTRACKS, 100, 400, 500, 600, 1000, 1500, 2000, 3000, 5000 (e.g., Busse and 
Tong, 2012; Busse, Jiang, and Tang, 2014; Ferson and Lin, 2014). 
6 Our results are similar if we exclude funds with below $5 million in TNA (e.g., Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng, 
2008) (see Panel A of Table A1 in the Internet Appendix).  
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fund portfolio level. Specifically, we calculate fund TNA as the sum of assets across all share 
classes and compute the value-weighted average of other fund characteristics across share 
classes.  
Another key data source is the SEC EDGAR (Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and 
Retrieval) database. In 2004, the SEC adopted a new federal rule that requires mutual funds to 
disclose their portfolio managers’ beneficiary ownership annually in the funds’ Statement of 
Additional Information (SAI). This new rule applies to all funds filing annual reports after 
February 28, 2005. Mutual funds do not have to disclose the exact dollar amount of managers’ 
ownership stake. Rather, they are required to report whether managerial ownership falls in one of 
the following seven ranges: $0 (none), $1–$10,000, $10,001–50,000, $50,001–$100,000, 
$100,001–$500,000, $500,001–$1,000,000, and above $1,000,000. We retrieve from EDGAR 
the SAI for each fund in our sample for each year from 2007 to 2014. We then manually collect 
portfolio manager ownership information for every sample fund at the end of each fiscal year-
end.7 The majority of sample funds are managed by portfolio manager teams and the ownership 
disclosures are at the individual manager level. We construct the aggregate ownership of a 
management team by adding up each manager’s reported stake in the fund.  
Finally, we obtain equity holdings for our sample funds from Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund 
Holdings (TRMFH) database, which contains the quarterly equity holdings of U.S. open-end 
mutual funds. To merge the MDMF and TRMFH databases, we first use fund tickers and fund 
CUSIPs whenever these are available.8 We then match the remaining sample manually, using 
fund names. We use the portfolio holdings data to construct the holdings-based risk change 
measures.  
                                                        
7 The portfolio manager ownership information disclosed in the Statement of Additional Information is as of the 
fiscal year-end of a fund. For most sample funds (i.e., over 85%), the fiscal year ends in the last quarter of the 
calendar year (i.e., October, November, or December).  
8 For the TRMFH database, we obtain the fund tickers and CUSIPs from the CRSP Mutual Fund database using the 





Managerial Ownership: As discussed earlier, mutual funds disclose managerial ownership in 
dollar ranges rather than disclosing the exact amount. Following Khorana, Servaes, and Wedge 
(2007), we convert the dollar ranges into dollar amounts by assuming the stake falls at the 
midpoint of the reported interval. For instance, if the managerial ownership is in the range of 
$100,001–$500,000, we assume the manager owns $300,000 in the fund. When ownership is 
reported to be none or over $1,000,000, we take the values to be $0 and $1,000,000, respectively.  
We construct two main measures of managerial ownership: (i) Ownership Dummy, an 
indicator variable that equals one if portfolio managers have a non-zero stake in the fund and 
zero otherwise; (ii) $Ownership, the aggregate dollar amount of portfolio manager ownership of 
a fund as of the year-end. Since the dollar amount of portfolio manager ownership is skewed, we 
compute and use its logarithm value, Log($Ownership), in the regression analysis.  
For robustness checks, we construct several alternative measures of managerial ownership. 
First, following the SEC rule, we classify the aggregate $Ownership into seven ranges, and 
construct Ownership Rank, which is set to one if $Ownership falls in the range of $0, and two, 
three, four, five, six, and seven, if it falls in the range of $1–$10,000, $10,001–50,000, $50,001–
$100,000, $100,001–$500,000, $500,001–$1,000,000, and above $1,000,000, respectively. 
Second, rather than computing the aggregate dollar amount of managerial ownership in the case 
of team-managed funds, we construct the average ownership, Mean $Ownership, by dividing the 
aggregate ownership by the number of portfolio managers in a fund. Third, we construct a 
percentage ownership measure, %Ownership, as the aggregate dollar amount of managerial 
ownership divided by the TNA of the fund.9 
Holdings-based Risk Change Measures: While many previous studies measure fund risk 
changes by comparing the standard deviations of fund returns over two non-overlapping time 
                                                        
9 Ideally, one would like to construct the percentage ownership measure as the dollar amount ownership divided by 
managers’ personal wealth. However, managers’ personal wealth is not observable.  
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periods, we are interested in the intended risk changes of a fund’s portfolio, which can deviate 
substantially from realized risk changes due to exogenous changes in the risk of constituent 
stocks. To separate managers’ intended changes in portfolio risk by actively managing their 
portfolios from unexpected changes in portfolio risk due to exogenous market conditions, we 
construct two holdings-based risk change measures.  
First, we follow Huang, Sialm, and Zhang (2011) and construct an across-year risk change 
measure based on fund portfolio holdings. It is defined as the difference between the current 
holdings volatility based on a fund’s most recently disclosed holdings and the past realized 
volatility based on its previously disclosed holdings:  
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴–𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻 − 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅  ,                                           (1) 
where 𝑅𝑅 indexes fund and 𝑡𝑡 indexes time (i.e., quarter). To estimate the current holdings volatility 
of fund 𝑅𝑅  at quarter 𝑡𝑡 , 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻 , we calculate the sample standard deviation of the return of a 
hypothetical portfolio that holds the most recently disclosed fund’s positions over the prior 52-
week period ending at the previous quarter-end t-1. Specifically, we first calculate the weekly 
returns of the hypothetical portfolio using the constant portfolio weight as of quarter t and asset 
returns over the prior 52-week period. We then calculate the standard deviation of the 
hypothetical portfolio return series. For the volatility of the realized returns,  𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅 , we first 
calculate the realized portfolio returns over the same 52-week period based on the disclosed 
holdings of the past quarters and then calculate the sample standard deviation of this realized 
portfolio return series. We calculate the difference between the current holdings volatility and the 
past realized volatility for each quarter and compute the average across quarters to obtain annual 
measure of risk change for a given fund. We annualize our risk change measure by multiplying it 
by the square root of 52 and present it in percentage points per year.  
Since we construct our holdings-based risk change measure by estimating the current 
holding volatility and the volatility realized over identical time periods, it allows us to isolate the 
intended risk-taking behavior from unintended changes in portfolio risk due to market 
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conditions. This measure has a positive value if the most recently disclosed holdings are riskier 
than past fund holdings, and vice versa. It equals zero if portfolio managers do not rebalance 
their portfolios over the estimation window.  
Second, we follow Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele (2009) and construct an intra-year risk 
change measure. Similar to Huang, Sialm, and Zhang (2011), Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele (2009) 
also use portfolio holdings to construct a measure to capture the intended risk change from the 
first half to the second half of the year. In particular, the intra-year risk change measure is 
constructed as: 
𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝑌𝑌–𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴  𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡2,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡1 .                                              (2) 
For fund i in year t, we compute the intended portfolio risk variable, 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡2,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, in the second 
half of the year based on the actual portfolio weights in the second half of the year and the 
volatility of the stocks in the first half of the year. We then calculate the intended risk change as 
in Eq. (2) by taking the difference of the intended portfolio risk in the second half of the year, 
𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡2,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, and the realized portfolio risk in the first half of the year, 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡1 , computed from the actual 
portfolio weights and stock volatility in the first half of the year. We use the standard deviation of 
26 weekly fund returns to measure fund volatility for each half-year period. By design, this 
measure captures the effect of active changes in portfolio composition in the second half over the 
first half of the year and is unaffected by changes in underlying stock volatility. Again, we 
annualize the risk change measure by multiplying it by the square root of 52 and present it in 
percentage points per year. 
Overall Risk Exposures: We use several proxies to measure the level of overall fund risk 
exposures. All measures use daily returns, net of fees. The first measure, Total Risk, is computed 
as the annualized standard deviation of fund returns. Next, we compute funds’ exposure to the 
market factor, Market Beta, by using the Carhart (1997) four-factor model: 
 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚 �𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,ℎ𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑢𝑢𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,     (3) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡  is the return of fund i in time t minus the risk-free rate; 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 is the 
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market factor (i.e., the excess return of the CRSP value-weighted market index over the risk-free 
rate); SMB is the return difference between small- and large-cap stocks; HML is the return 
difference between high and low book-to-market stocks, and UMD is the return difference 
between stocks with high and low past returns. Finally, we follow Ang, Chen, and Xing (2006) 
and calculate funds’ Downside Beta using return data conditional on the market factor being 
negative.  
Other Variables: We include a set of additional variables to control for fund, manager, and 
family-specific characteristics in our empirical analysis. The variable Fund Size is the sum of 
assets under management across all share classes. We aggregate Fund Size in each family to 
obtain Family Size. Variable Cum.12-Month Ret. (Cum.6-Month Ret.) is the cumulative net-of-
fee  return over the 12-month (first 6-month) window in a year; Fund Age is the number of 
months that the oldest share class has been traded; Net Flows is calculated as the change in TNA 
excluding growth in TNA due to fund returns (Sirri and Tufano, 1998); Expense Ratio is 
determined by dividing the fund’s operating expenses by the average dollar value of assets under 
management; Turnover Ratio is defined as the minimum of sales or purchases divided by the 
TNA of the fund; Manager Tenure measures the length of time that a manager has been at the 
helm of a mutual fund; Team is a dummy variable that equals one if a fund is managed by 
multiple managers and zero otherwise; and Fund Activeness is constructed as one minus the R-
squared of Carhart (1997) four-factor model regressions following Amihud and Goyenko (2013).  
 
2.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Our final sample consists of 1,610 unique domestic equity funds from 369 fund families, 
covering 8,269 fund–year observations. As shown in Table 1, we find that about 71% of sample 
funds have at least one manager co-investing in the fund, with an average stake of about 
$540,000. On average, the co-investment of a portfolio manager (or a management team) 
represents 0.3% of the fund’s TNA. The average fund in our sample has about $1.4 billion in 
12 
 
assets under management, a 17-year history, a 1.3% expense ratio, and a 76% turnover ratio and 
it has been managed by multiple managers for about six years in a family that manages a total of 
$155 billion assets.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
The mean (median) across-year risk change measure of our sample funds is 0.30% (0.14%), 
which is similar in magnitude to Huang, Sialm, and Zhang (2011). That is, an average fund 
increases its annualized volatility by about 0.30% during the sample period. The mean (median) 
intra-year risk change measure is 0.58% (0.17%).  
Our sample spans nine investment styles based on Morningstar Category three-by-three 
classification: large-cap value, large-cap growth, large-cap blend, mid-cap value, mid-cap 
growth, mid-cap blend, small-cap value, small-cap growth, and small-cap blend. Overall, it does 
not appear that portfolio managers of a particular investment style are more likely to invest in 
their own funds than managers of other styles. As shown in Figure 1, the percentage of 
observations with positive ownership within each category is similar across the nine styles. In 
terms of the dollar value, we observe that managers of large-cap blend funds have the highest 
ownership (with an average of $646,000) and managers of small-cap growth funds own the least 
(with an average of $429,000). 
 [Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Figure 2 shows that the managerial ownership persists over the sample period 2007–2014. 
The percentage of mutual funds that have positive ownership stays around 70%. This is 
noticeably higher than what has been documented by Khorana, Servaes, and Wedge (2007), 
which is around 50% at year-end of 2004. Regarding the average dollar amount of portfolio 
manager ownership, we find that ownership seems to increase slowly over time during our 
sample period and the level is lowest in 2008 (with an average of $444,000) and highest in 2014 
(with an average of $673,000).  




3. Portfolio Manager Ownership and Mutual Fund Risk Changes 
In this section, we first analyze the relation between managerial ownership and changes in 
fund risk, followed by a battery of robustness checks on the baseline results.  
 
3.1 Managerial Ownership and Changes in Fund Risk Taking  
We examine the relation between managerial ownership and changes in fund risk taking by 
estimating the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression: 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑎𝑎𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  + 𝛾𝛾𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡.                        (4) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the across-year or intra-year holdings-based risk change measure for 
fund i in year t. 10  The main independent variable of interest is the measure of managerial 
ownership in fund i in year t-1, that is, Ownership Dummy or Log($Ownership). 11  The 
coefficient 𝛽𝛽  captures the relation between managerial ownership and changes in fund risk 
taking. According to our hypothesis, we expect  𝛽𝛽 to be negative. As for control variables, we 
include a vector of manager, fund, and family characteristics that may influence fund risk 
changes based on the prior literature. For instance, since Kempf and Ruenzi (2008) find that risk 
changes are more pronounced among managers of funds with high expense ratios, managed by a 
single manager, and belong to large families, we control for expense ratio, a team fund dummy, 
and family size. We also control for fund past performance (past year cumulative returns), fund 
age, and manager tenure because prior studies (e.g., Kempf, Ruenzi and Thiele, 2009; Huang, 
Sialm, and Zhang, 2011) suggest that underperforming funds, younger funds, and managers with 
                                                        
10 Our results are qualitatively similar if we use two alternative holdings-based risk change measures (see Panel A of 
Table A2 in the Internet Appendix). First, we estimate the across-year risk change measure using 24 monthly returns 
rather than using 52 weekly returns. Second, we follow Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele (2009) and compute the intra-
year risk change measure as the ratio, rather than the difference, between the intended and the realized portfolio risk.  
11 Our results remain largely unchanged if we use the following alternative ownership measures: (i) Ownership 
Rank; (ii)Log(Mean $Ownership), the logarithm of $Ownership divided by the number of portfolio managers in a 
fund; (iii) %Ownership, the percentage of $Ownership over funds’ total net assets (see Panel B of Table A2 in the 
Internet Appendix). Our results are also similar if we exclude from our analysis funds with managerial ownership 
greater than $1 million (see Panel B of Table A1 in the Internet Appendix). Overall, these results suggest that our 




shorter tenure might have greater risk-taking incentives. Also, higher fund activeness (or style 
distinctiveness) suggests greater investment skill and therefore lowers the need for risk changes 
(Huang, Sialm, and Zhang, 2011). All independent variables are measured as of the previous 
year-end to mitigate potential reverse causality concerns. We include the current year first 6-
month cumulative net return in the regression when analyzing Intra-Year Risk Change. Finally, 
we control for investment objectives and year fixed effects in the regressions and cluster the 
standard errors at the fund level.12        
 [Insert Table 2 about here] 
We present the estimation results of Eq. (4) in Table 2. Consistent with the hypothesis, we 
find that managers with co-investment are associated with greater risk reduction in the 
subsequent year compared to those who don’t invest in their own funds. As shown in columns 
(1) and (2), the estimated coefficients on the two proxies of managerial ownership are negative 
and significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on Ownership Dummy is −0.313, with a t-stat. of 
−5.47. It indicates that the Across-Year Risk Change measure of funds with managerial 
ownership is 0.31% lower than that of funds without ownership, with the sample average of 
Across-Year Risk Change being 0.30%. In addition, the higher the ownership stakes, the greater 
the reduction in risk taking. The coefficient on Log($Ownership) is −0.027 (t-stat.= −6.00). In 
terms of economic significance, a one standard deviation increase in Log($Ownership) is 
associated with a 9.7% standard deviation decrease in the Across-Year Risk Change measure.  
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 show the estimation results of Eq. (4) using Intra-Year Risk 
Change as the dependent variable. Similar to the evidence in columns (1) and (2), both measures 
of managerial ownership have negative coefficients and are significant at the 1% level. In 
                                                        
12 There are general trends in aggregate market volatility during our sample period, due to the 2008 financial crisis 
and the recovery afterwards. Our holdings-based risk change measures are designed to filter out the impact of 
overall market volatility and we control for year fixed effects in all regressions. Nevertheless, to address any 
remaining concern regarding market volatility, we estimate the regressions separately for each year in our sample 
period and find similar results in almost all years (see Table A3 in the Internet Appendix). In addition, we find 
qualitatively similar results across subsamples of funds partitioned based on team management dummy and the 
median fund size, net flows, turnover ratio, one minus R-squared (Amihud and Goyenko, 2013), active share 
(Cremers and Petajisto, 2009), or expense ratio (see Table A4 in the Internet Appendix).   
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particular, the coefficient on Ownership Dummy is −0.363 with a t-stat. of −5.75. This value 
implies that the Intra-Year Risk Change measure of managers who co-invest in their funds is 
0.36% lower than those with zero co-investment in the fund, with the sample average of Intra-
Year Risk Change being 0.58%. Moreover, the coefficient on Log($Ownership) is −0.032, with a 
t-stat. of −6.40. In terms of economic significance, a one standard deviation increase in 
Log($Ownership) is associated with a 7.8% standard deviation decrease in the Intra-Year Risk 
Change measure. Overall, these findings suggest that managerial ownership reduces both intra-
year and across-year risk taking of portfolio managers. 
As far as the control variables are concerned, we find that managers who are facing greater 
risk-taking incentives, that is, those who are underperforming their peers, have shorter tenure in 
mutual fund industry, and running younger funds, are associated with higher increases in risk 
taking. 13  Consistent with Kempf and Ruenzi (2008), we find that risk changes are more 
pronounced for solo-managed funds and funds belong to larger families. There is also weak 
evidence that fund activeness negatively relates to risk change measures, consistent with the idea 
that more distinctive fund strategies imply greater manager investment skill, hence lowering the 
need for risk changes.      
 
3.2 Robustness Tests 
Our baseline results show a negative relation between managerial ownership and fund 
holding-based risk change measures. In this section, we perform a series of tests to assess the 
robustness of our results.  
3.2.1 Absolute Value of Risk Changes – Risk Shifting  
                                                        
13 In columns (3) and (4) of Table 2, we find that the relation between intra-year risk change and first 6-month 
performance is negative but insignificant, which may seem inconsistent with the fund tournament literature. 
However, when we follow Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele (2009) and use performance rank within each investment 
objective in our analysis, we find that intra-year risk change is negatively and significantly related to the 
performance rank of the first half of the current year as well as the performance rank of last year (see Table A5 in the 
Internet Appendix).      
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In this section, we examine whether managerial ownership affects “risk shifting” (i.e., shift 
in risk regardless of direction, either increase or decrease) as captured by the absolute value of 
the corresponding risk change measures. We present the results in Panel A of Table 3. We find 
that there is also a negative relation between managerial ownership and the absolute value of the 
risk change measures. The coefficient estimates on ownership proxies are all negative and 
significant at the 1% level, with the magnitude being slightly smaller than the corresponding 
estimates in Table 2. This evidence suggests that the negative relation between managerial 
ownership and risk changes in Table 2 is mainly driven by mitigating intended increases in 
portfolio risk (i.e., the risk change measures being less positive), rather than incentivizing 
intended decreases in portfolio risk (i.e., the risk change measures being more negative). 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
3.2.2 Changes in Managerial Ownership  
Instead of using levels of managerial ownership, we also examine changes in ownership and 
repeat the analysis of Eq. (4) using ownership changes as the independent variable of interest. 
First, we find that, like what we observe at the aggregate level (Figure 2), ownership at the 
individual fund level is relatively stable over time. Of the 7,267 fund-year observations for which 
we can calculate the changes in ownership, the median change is zero, with the average at 
$41,000. There are 1,578 cases with dollar ownership increases (mean=$310,000, 
median=$250,000), and 638 cases with ownership decreases (mean=−$290,000; 
median=−$250,000). While increases in managerial ownership are distributed evenly across 
time, about one third of the decreases in ownership occur in 2008, likely due to the financial 
crisis.  
We repeat our baseline analysis using two measures of ownership changes. The first, 
∆Ownership Dummy, is a categorical variable that takes value of 1 for funds with a positive 
change in ownership, −1 for a negative change, and 0 for no change. The second measure, 
Log∆$Ownership, is a continuous variable that equals the logarithm of one plus the change in 
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dollar ownership (for negative changes in ownership, we multiple the logarithm of one plus the 
absolute value of the ownership change by −1). To control for the potential effect of financial 
crisis in 2008, we also include the interaction between ownership change measures and an 
indicator variable for year 2008. Finally, to avoid potential confounding effects of managerial 
turnover, we conduct our analysis excluding the fund-year observations experiencing managerial 
turnover. As shown in Panel B of Table 3, the coefficients of the ownership change proxies are 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level across all specifications, suggesting that 
portfolio managers reduce risk following increases in ownership, and vice versa. This evidence 
further corroborates our baseline finding of a negative relation between managerial ownership 
and fund risk changes. 
3.2.3 Controlling for Impact of Portfolio Managers and Fund Families    
One may argue that certain portfolio managers are less prone to excess risk-taking behavior 
for various reasons and at the same time more likely to co-invest in the funds they manage. We 
carry out two sets of tests to address this concern. First, we conduct our analysis with portfolio 
manager fixed effects using a subsample of portfolio managers who manage multiple funds 
simultaneously. 14  In particular, we estimate regression specification Eq. (4) at the portfolio 
manager level and include manager fixed effects, with the standard errors clustered at the 
manager level. As shown in columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) in Panel C of Table 3, across all four 
specifications, the coefficients on the ownership variables are negative and significant at the 1% 
level. This result suggests that managers who manage multiple funds reduce more risk in the 
funds in which they have a higher ownership stake, compared to the funds in which they invest 
less. This evidence further corroborates our main findings that portfolio manager ownership 
reduces fund risk taking.  
Second, we control for the compensation incentives of fund managers in our regressions. 
Specifically, we include two incentive variables based on advisory fee contracts: (i) Coles 
                                                        
14 Out of 3,479 unique portfolio managers in our sample, 2,652 managers run more than one fund at a certain time 
point during our sample period, which corresponds to 10,955 manager-fund-year observations in total. 
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Incentive Rate and (ii) a dummy variable for performance advisory fee (i.e., fulcrum fee) (Coles, 
Suay, and Woodbury, 2000; Elton, Gruber, and Blake, 2003; Massa and Patgiri, 2009). 15 In 
addition, we include a set of variables that capture the structures of individual portfolio manager 
compensation from fund advisors (Ma, Tang, and Gomez, 2016). Specifically, we include four 
dummy variables that set to one if the portfolio manager compensation is based on fund 
performance (typically with a three-year evaluation window), AUM, advisor profits, and fixed 
salary, respectively, and zero otherwise. After controlling for all these variables, we continue to 
find a negative and significant relation between ownership and risk taking (see Panel A of Table 
A6 in the Internet Appendix).16  
Finally, we investigate whether our findings are driven by any potential family policies 
regarding portfolio manager ownership. In particular, we conduct our analysis with family fixed 
effects and examine how changes in fund risk taking relate to within-family variation in 
managerial ownership.17 We find that our baseline results remain qualitatively similar when we 
include family fixed effects in our regressions. Specifically, as shown in columns (3), (4), (7), 
and (8) in Panel C of Table 3, across all four specifications, the coefficients on the ownership 
variables are negative and significant at the 1% level. Overall, our evidence suggests that family 
policy is unlikely the main reason for the negative relation between managerial ownership and 
changes in fund risk taking. 
                                                        
15 Following Coles, Suay, and Woodbury (2000) and Massa and Patgiri (2009), we define Coles Incentive Rate as the 
difference between the last and first marginal advisory fee rates divided by the effective marginal advisory fee rate, 
all as a percentage of fund AUM. This measure captures the concavity of funds’ advisory fee schedule. It takes 
negative values for concave advisory fee structures and zero for linear advisory fee schedules. 
16  Our baseline results are also similar when we control for portfolio managers’ education background as in 
Chevalier and Ellison (1999) and gender (see Panel B of Table A6 in the Internet Appendix).  
17 Alternatively, we exclude cases where all funds in a family have non-zero managerial ownership (35.2% of the 
sample) and cases where none of the managers in a family has any ownership in the funds (7.4% of the sample). Our 





4. Agency-Induced Risk-Taking Incentives and the Effects of Ownership  
In this section, we investigate the channel through which managerial ownership affects risk 
changes. In particular, we examine whether the effect of ownership varies with the level of 
agency-induced risk-taking incentives. If managerial ownership serves to alleviate the conflicts 
of interest between fund managers and investors, one would expect the effect of ownership to be 
particularly strong among managers with high incentives to engage in agency-induced risk-
taking behavior. We test the above hypothesis in this section.   
 
4.1 Main Results on Agency-Induced Risk-Taking Incentives 
In our main analysis, we use the following two measures to capture mangers’ risk-taking 
incentives: (i) convexity of fund flow-performance relation; and (ii) fund past performance. 
Based on previous studies, fund managers’ agency-induced risk-taking incentives are high when 
(i) they face a convex flow-performance relation (e.g., Chevalier and Ellison, 1997)), and (ii) 
when they are underperforming their peers (e.g., Brown, Harlow, and Starks, 1996). To test the 
hypothesis above, we estimate the following OLS regressions: 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑎𝑎𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑎𝑎𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 ∗ �1 − 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� +
𝛽𝛽3𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛾𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,                    (5)  
where 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the across-year or intra-year risk change measure for fund 𝑅𝑅 in year t; 
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if (i) fund i’s flow-performance relation is 
convex and (ii) fund i is underperforming its peers. The coefficient 𝛽𝛽1 (𝛽𝛽2) captures the relation 
between managerial ownership and fund risk taking when 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 is one (zero). We carry out F-
tests to compare the differences between 𝛽𝛽1 and 𝛽𝛽2. We include the same set of controls as in Eq. 
(4) and cluster the standard errors at the fund level.  
We report the estimation results in Table 4. Panel A of Table 4 presents the results using the 
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convexity of flow-performance relation as the proxy for risk-taking incentive. 18 As expected, we 
find that a convex flow-performance relation induces managers to take on more risk. That is, the 
coefficient of the indicator variable for the convex flow-performance relation is positive and 
significant at the 5% level or lower. More importantly, we show that the effect of ownership on 
risk taking for the subsample of funds with a convex flow-performance relation is about three 
times the size of the effect over the subsample without such convex relation. Moreover, as shown 
in the bottom row of Panel A, the F-tests show that the differences between 𝛽𝛽1  and 𝛽𝛽2  are 
significant at the 1% level in all four specifications. In addition, we use alternative measures to 
capture the convexity of the flow-performance sensitivity. Chevalier and Ellison (1997) 
document that younger funds have a more convex flow-performance relation compared to older 
funds. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the effect of ownership on risk taking is 
stronger among younger funds (see Panel B of Table A7 in the Internet Appendix).19 Overall, we 
find strong evidence that managerial ownership greatly reduces risk taking among funds with 
convex flow-performance sensitivity.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Panel B of Table 4 reports the results based on fund past performance. Since most individual 
portfolio managers in the mutual fund industry are evaluated on a three-year window in their 
compensation (Ma, Tang, and Gomez, 2016), we use past two years’ cumulative return to 
measure fund performance (for intra-year risk change analysis, we compute the 30-month 
cumulative return of past two years and first 6-month return of year t) .20 We create a dummy 
                                                        
18 To measure the convexity of individual funds’ flow-performance relation, we draw insight from the literature on 
asymmetric correlations of stock returns (e.g., Longin and Solnik, 2001; Ang and Chen, 2002; Hong, Tu, and Zhou, 
2007). A fund’s flow-performance relation is convex when the correlation between monthly fund flows and past 12-
month net performance conditional on return being positive is greater than the correlation conditional on return 
being negative, measured using the time series data of a fund in the past 5 years. We obtain similar results if we use 
the two coefficients of regressing flow on positive vs. negative performance, rather than using the two correlations 
(see Panel A of Table A7 in the Internet Appendix).  
19 We also find that the effect of ownership on risk taking is stronger among funds of small families than of larger 
families, consistent with Huang, Wei, and Yan (2007). However, the difference between the two subsamples is not 
statistically significant (see Panel C of Table A7 in the Internet Appendix). 
20 We obtain similar results if we use past one-year cumulative net return to measure fund performance when 
analyzing across-year risk changes and use the 6-month cumulative return of the current year when analyzing intra-
year risk changes (see Panel D of Table A7 in the Internet Appendix). 
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Loser if a fund’s past performance is in the bottom quartile. As expected, we find that funds with 
poor past performance are more likely to increase risk. Moreover, consistent with our hypothesis, 
we find that manager ownership has a significantly greater effect in reducing risk taking among 
loser funds compared to their counterparts. The coefficient estimates of the ownership measures 
among loser funds are two to three times the size as the estimates among other funds, with the 
differences being significant at the 1% level in all four specifications. Taken together, our results 
in Table 5 show that the effect of ownership in reducing risk taking is particularly strong among 
managers with greater agency-induced risk-taking incentives, consistent with the idea that 
managerial ownership serves to alleviate agency conflicts.  
We next perform additional tests to assess the robustness of our results in Table 4. First, we 
repeat the analysis in Table 4 using three alternative ownership measures and obtain qualitatively 
similar results (see Table A8 of the Internet Appendix). Second, to alleviate the concern that our 
findings are driven by certain portfolio manager characteristics or fund family policies, similar to 
our analysis in Section 3.2.3, we repeat our analysis in Table 4 with portfolio manager fixed 
effects or fund family fixed effects included. As shown in Panels A and B of Table 5, for both 
sets of fixed effects, we continue to find that the negative relation between managerial ownership 
and risk changes is significantly stronger among managers with high agency-induced risk-taking 
incentives. Therefore, portfolio manager characteristics or family policies are unlikely the 
underlying driver for our findings in Table 4.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
4.2 Additional Proxies for Agency-Induced Risk-Taking Incentives 
In this section, we consider several additional variables to proxy for fund managers’ agency-
induced risk-taking incentives. In particular, we repeat our analysis in Table 4 using the 
following proxies for risk-taking incentives: (i) individual managers’ compensation structures; 
and (ii) manager tenure in the mutual fund industry. Based on previous research, fund managers’ 
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agency-induced risk-taking incentives are higher when the portfolio managers are not 
compensated based on long-term fund performance (Ma, Tang, and Gomez, 2016) or when the 
managers have a short tenure in the fund industry (Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele, 2009). In 
particular, Ma, Tang, and Gomez (2016) find that managers who are compensated based on 
funds’ long-term investment performance (with the typical evaluation period being three years) 
engage less in risk-taking activities compared to managers without such incentive. Kempf, 
Ruenzi, and Thiele (2009) find that managers with shorter tenure respond the same way to 
employment risk as those with longer tenure; but are more responsive to tournament incentives 
and take on more risk once performing poorly. We expect the effect of ownership on risk taking 
to be stronger among managers without long-term performance-based pay, and managers with 
shorter tenure. 
We present the estimation results using above alterative proxies in Table 6. Panel A of Table 
6 reports the results based on individual managers’ compensation structure. Consistent with Ma, 
Tang, and Gomez (2016), portfolio managers having compensation that is explicitly linked to 
long-term fund performance exhibit significantly less risk taking. Moreover, we find that the 
effect of ownership on risk taking for the subsample of managers without explicit performance-
based pay is at least three times as large as of the effect among managers with performance-
linked pay, with the differences being significant at the 5% level or lower in all specifications. 
Panel B of Table 6 presents the results on portfolio manager tenure, defined as the experience a 
manager has in the mutual fund industry.21 We find that the risk change measures are negatively 
related to manager tenure. Moreover, the impact of managerial ownership on risk taking for 
managers with shorter tenure is about two times the magnitude of the effect for managers with 
longer tenure, with the differences being significant at the 5% level or lower in all specifications. 
                                                        
21 We find qualitatively similar results if we use portfolio manager age to proxy for risk-taking incentives (see Panel 
E of Table A7 in the Internet Appendix). 
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Taken together, our analysis in Section 4 consistently suggests that the main mechanism of 
managerial ownership’s impact on risk changes is through mitigating managers’ agency-induced 
risk-taking behavior. 
 
5. Managerial Ownership and the Level of Fund Risk Exposures  
In this section, we examine how managerial ownership affects the level of fund risk 
exposures. Similar to the relation between ownership and the change in fund risk, the relation 
between ownership and the level of risk could also be due to agency conflicts inherent in any 
principal-agent relationship. For example, the risk aversion of the manager may different from 
that of the investors. Ownership increases the sensitivity of managers’ wealth to fund 
performance, which could lead to lower level of fund risk if portfolio managers are risk averse. 
As a result, we also expect a negative relation between managerial ownership and the level of 
fund risk. We also recognize that opposite could be true if the managers who co-invest in their 
own funds are overconfident/less risk averse and thus associated with higher level of risk. To 
analyze how managerial ownership relates to the level of fund risk, we estimate the following 
OLS regression:  
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 𝐻𝐻𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑎𝑎𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  + 𝛾𝛾𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,                          (6) 
where the dependent variable, 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 𝐻𝐻𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌𝐶𝐶, is the level of risk exposure of fund i in year t. We use 
three variables to measure the level of fund risk exposures: (i) total risk (i.e., annualized standard 
deviation of fund returns); (ii) market beta, and (ii) downside beta. We control for the same set of 
variables as in Eq. (4) and cluster the standard errors at the fund level.  
We present the estimation results of Eq. (6) in Table 7. As shown in columns (1) and (2), the 
estimated coefficients on both proxies of managerial ownership are negative and significant at 
the 1% level. For instance, the coefficient estimate Ownership Dummy in column (1) is −0.356 
(t-stat.= −2.74), suggesting that the level of total risk of funds with positive managerial 
ownership is 0.36% lower than that of those without ownership, on average. Our results in 
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columns (4)-(6) further show that portfolio manager ownership is also associated with lower 
fund market beta and lower downside beta. 22 The coefficients on managerial ownership are 
negative and significant at the 1% level or lower in all four specifications.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Overall, these results indicate that, ceteris paribus, funds with greater managerial ownership 
are associated with lower levels of total risk, systematic risk, and downside risk. While we 
recognize that proxies such as return volatility or betas may not best capture manager’s intended 
risk-taking behavior, our evidence on fund risk exposures provides additional insight into the 
relation between managerial ownership and risk taking.   
 
6. Conclusion 
Prior literature provides empirical evidence suggesting that there exists excess risk-taking 
behavior in the mutual fund industry, which can be detrimental to fund performance. We focus 
on one potential mechanism, namely, portfolio manager ownership, in alleviating managers’ 
incentives to engage in such risk-taking behavior. Using holdings-based measures that capture 
managers’ ex ante risk choices, we find that portfolio manager ownership reduces both intra-year 
and across-year fund risk-taking activities. The relation between ownership and risk reduction is 
stronger among managers with higher agency-induced risk-taking incentives, e.g., those who 
face a more convex flow-performance relation, have poor past performance, or are not 
compensated based on long-term fund performance. Moreover, we find that funds with greater 
managerial ownership are associated with lower levels of total risk, systematic risk, and 
downside risk.  
                                                        
22  In addition to the loading on the market factor (i.e., market beta), we also examine the relation between 
managerial ownership and three other loadings of Carhart (1997) four-factor model. We find that portfolio manager 
ownership is associated with significantly lower momentum beta, and not significantly related to size or book-to-
market beta (see Panel A of Table A9 in the Internet Appendix). Our results are also similar if we use weekly fund 
returns to calculate the total risk measures (see Panel B of Table A9 in the Internet Appendix). Finally, we test the 
relation between managerial ownership and fund co-skewness with the market factor and find that ownership is not 
significantly related to fund co-skewness (see Panel C of Table A9 in the Internet Appendix).  
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Taken together, our evidence suggests that portfolio manager ownership serves as an 
incentive alignment mechanism by mitigating managers’ incentives to engage in agency-issue-
induced risk-taking behavior. Our results also indicate that it is beneficial to the vast mutual fund 
investors when portfolio managers have some skin in the game, and that portfolio manager 
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Figure 1. Portfolio Manager Ownership across Investment Objectives 
 
This figure presents the distribution of funds with positive portfolio manager ownership (Ownership Dummy=1) and 
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Figure 2. Yearly Distribution of Portfolio Manager Ownership  
 
This figure presents the distribution of funds with positive portfolio manager ownership (Ownership Dummy=1) and 
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This table reports summary statistics of all the main variables used in our analysis. The variable Ownership Dummy 
is an indicator variable that equals one if portfolio managers have non-zero stakes in the fund and zero otherwise. 
Since mutual funds disclose managerial ownership in the ranges $0 (none), $1–$10,000, $10,001–50,000, $50,001–
$100,000, $100,001–$500,000, $500,001–$1,000,000, and above $1,000,000, we assume managerial ownership to 
be at either the midpoint, minimum, or maximum of the reported interval, and label the variables $Ownership, 
$Ownership(Min), and $Ownership(Max), respectively. In the case of team-managed funds, we construct the 
aggregate ownership of the team by adding up each manager’s ownership stakes in the fund. The variable Across-
Year Risk Change and Intra-Year Risk Change are defined as in Eq. (1) and Eq. (2), respectively. Total Risk is 
computed as the annualized standard deviation of fund daily returns. Market Beta is the factor loading on the market 
factor (i.e., the excess return of the CRSP value-weighted market index over the risk-free rate) and Downside Beta is 
constructed using daily return data conditional on the market factor being negative. Cum.12-Month Ret. (Cum. 6-
Month Return) is the cumulative net-of-fee return over the 12-month (6-month) window in a year. Net Flows is 
calculated as the change in TNA excluding growth in TNA due to fund returns (Sirri and Tufano, 1998); Fund Size is 
the sum of assets under management across all share classes, and we aggregate fund TNA in the family to obtain 
Family Size; Fund Age is the number of months the oldest share class has traded; Expense is calculated by dividing 
the fund’s operating expenses by the average dollar value of its assets under management; Turnover Ratio is defined 
as the minimum of sales or purchases divided by the TNA of the fund; Fund Activeness is defined as one minus the 
R-squared from Carhart (1997) four-factor model regressions; Team is a dummy variable that equals one if a fund is 
managed by multiple managers and zero otherwise; and Manager Tenure measures the length of time that a manager 
has been at the helm of a mutual fund.  
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VARIABLES Mean Median Std. Dev. 1% 99% N 
Panel A. Portfolio Manager Ownership 
     Ownership Dummy 0.71 1 0.45 0 1 8,269 
Log($Ownership) 9.13 12.61 5.95 0 15.15 8,269 
$Ownership 540,548 300,001 737,735 0 3,800,000 8,269 
$Ownership (Min) 397,438 100,001 638,125 0 3,200,000 8,269 
$Ownership (Max) 683,922 500,000 872,257 0 4,500,000 8,269 
       
Panel B. Risk-Taking Measures 
      Across-Year Risk Change (%) 0.30 0.14 1.66 -4.99 7.19 8,269 
Intra-Year Risk Change (%) 0.58 0.17 2.45 -5.33 11.83 8,269 
Total Risk (%) 21.78 18.31 9.62 9.03 46.14 8269 
Market Beta 0.99 1.00 0.12 0.54 1.26 8269 
Downside Beta 1.01 1.02 0.16 0.42 1.38 8269 
      
Panel C. Other Variables 
     Cum.12-Month Ret.(%) 9.82 12.64 22.61 -47.93 56.18 8,269 
Fund Size ($billions) 1.40 0.33 3.32 0.02 23.40 8,269 
Fund Age (months) 204 168 146 42 883 8,269 
Expense (%) 1.26 1.27 0.37 0.23 2.17 8,269 
Turnover (%) 75.99 58.00 68.77 3.00 407.00 8,269 
Net Flows (%) 0.11 -0.45 2.96 -5.62 14.96 8,269 
Fund Activeness (%) 7.70 4.38 9.89 0.44 61.74 8,269 
Team 0.68 1 0.47 0 1 8,269 
Manager Tenure (months) 82.49 70 56.76 4 282 8,269 
Family Size ($billions) 155 24.8 338 0.03 1,440 8,269 




Portfolio Manager Ownership and Mutual Fund Risk Changes 
 
This table presents an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of Eq. (4) on the relation between portfolio manager 
ownership and fund across-year and intra-year risk changes. The dependent variables Across-Year Risk Change and 
Intra-Year Risk Change are defined as in Eq. (1) and Eq. (2), respectively. All other variables are defined as in Table 
1. We control for investment objectives and year fixed effects in the regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the 
fund level. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
 
 Across-Year Risk Changet  Intra-Year Risk Changet 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
            

















Cum.6-Month Ret.t    -0.006 -0.005 
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Objective & Year FEs Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Observations 8,269 8,269 
 
8,269 8,269 




Portfolio Manager Ownership and Mutual Fund Risk Changes: Robustness 
 
This table reports the results of several robustness tests on the relation between portfolio manager ownership and 
mutual fund risk changes. In Panel A, we repeat the analysis in Table 2 using the absolute value of across-year and 
intra-year risk change measures as the dependent variables. In Panel B, we use changes in manager ownership as 
key independent variables and repeat the analysis in Table 2. In particular, we construct the following two variables: 
(i) ∆Ownership Dummy is a categorical variable that takes value of 1 for funds with a positive change in ownership, 
0 for no change, and −1 for a negative ownership change; (ii) Log(∆$Ownership) is a continuous variable that equals 
the logarithm of 1 plus the change in dollar ownership (for negative change in ownership, we multiple the logarithm 
of 1 plus absolute value of the change in dollar ownership by −1). We first use the entire sample to conduct the 
analysis and tabulate the results in columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) of Panel B. We then drop those observations that 
experience manager turnover, and present the results in columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) of Panel B. In columns (1), (2), 
(5), and (6) of Panel C, we present the estimation results of Eq. (4) with portfolio manager fixed effects using the 
sample of portfolio managers who manage multiple funds simultaneously. We add fund family fixed effects as 
additional control variables and present the results in columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) of Panel C. For the sake of 
brevity, we only report the coefficient estimates of the main variables of interest, although all control variables from 
Table 2 are included. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Absolute Value of Across-Year and Intra-Year Risk Changes 
 Absolute Across-Year Risk Changet  Absolute Intra-Year Risk Changet 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
            
Ownership Dummyt-1 -0.225***   -0.174***  
 
(-4.34)   (-2.60)  
Log($Ownership)t-1  -0.020***   -0.015*** 
 
 (-4.87)   (-2.96) 
      
Controls t-1 Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Objective & Year FEs Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 8,269 8,269  8,269 8,269 





Panel B: Changes in Managerial Ownership 
  Across-Year Risk Changet  Intra-Year Risk Changet 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
              
∆Ownership Dummyt-1 -0.093***  -0.095***   -0.155***  -0.142***  
 
(-3.21)  (-3.00)   (-4.33)  (-3.90)  
Log(∆$Ownership)t-1  -0.008***  -0.008***   -0.013***  -0.011*** 
  (-3.23)  (-2.92)   (-4.27)  (-3.78) 
 
         
Controls t-1 Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Objective & Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,267 7,267 6,000 6,000  7,267 7,267 6,000 6,000 




Panel C: Manager Fixed Effects and Family Fixed Effects 
  Across-Year Risk Changet  Intra-Year Risk Changet 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
              
Ownership Dummyt-1 -0.178***  -0.181***   -0.232***  -0.184***  
 
(-3.09)  (-3.44)   (-2.81)  (-2.70)  
Log($Ownership)t-1  -0.015***  -0.016***   -0.018***  -0.016*** 
  (-3.04)  (-3.70)   (-2.58)  (-2.99) 
 
         
Controls t-1 Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Objective & Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Manager FEs Yes Yes No No  Yes Yes No No 
Family FEs No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
Observations 10,955 10,955 8,269 8,269  10,955 10,955 8,269 8,269 





Risk-Taking Incentives and the Impact of Ownership on Risk Changes 
 
In this table, we examine the interaction effects between two proxies of agency-induced risk-taking incentives and the 
effect of portfolio manager ownership on risk changes. The regressions are specified as in Eq. (5). These proxies of 
risk-taking incentives include dummy variables indicating (1) whether fund flow-performance relation is convex 
based on the monthly time series data of a fund in the past 5 years (Panel A); (2) whether a fund is a loser fund that 
underperforming its peers, i.e., in the bottom quartile based on its past performance (Panel B). For the sake of brevity, 
we only report the coefficient estimates of the main variables of interest, although all control variables from Table 2 
are included. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Convex vs. Non-Convex Flow-Performance Relation 
 Across-Year Risk Changet  Intra-Year Risk Changet 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
          
Ownership Dummyt-1×Convex -0.417***   -0.497***  
 
(-4.87)   (-4.98)  
Ownership Dummyt-1×Non-Convex -0.136**   -0.153**  
 
(-2.31)   (-2.12)  
Log($Ownership)t-1×Convex  -0.037***   -0.043*** 
  (-5.68)   (-5.66) 
Log($Ownership)t-1×Non-Convex  -0.012***   -0.014** 
  (-2.66)   (-2.53) 
Convex 0.254*** 0.280***  0.229** 0.247** 
 (3.11) (3.52)  (2.20) (2.42) 
      
Controls t-1 Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Objective& Year FEs Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 7,063 7,063  7,063 7,063 
Adj. R-Squared 0.157 0.158  0.272 0.273 




Panel B: Whether Fund Past Performance is in the Bottom Quartile (Loser)  
 Across-Year Risk Changet  Intra-Year Risk Changet 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
          
Ownership Dummyt-1×Loser -0.590***   -0.722***  
 
(-5.28)   (-4.72)  
Ownership Dummyt-1×Non-Loser -0.220***   -0.246***  
 
(-3.77)   (-4.03)  
Log($Ownership)t-1×Loser  -0.051***   -0.065*** 
  (-5.90)   (-5.49) 
Log($Ownership)t-1×Non-Loser  -0.019***   -0.021*** 
  (-4.22)   (-4.43) 
Loser 0.356** 0.382**  0.349* 0.409** 
 (2.08) (2.25)  (1.74) (2.04) 
      
Controls t-1 Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Objective& Year FEs Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 8,269 8,269  8,269 8,269 
Adj. R-Squared 0.150 0.152  0.266 0.267 




Risk-Taking Incentives and the Impact of Ownership: Manager and Family Fixed Effects 
 
This table reports the results of robustness tests on the risk-taking incentives and the impact of ownership on risk changes. We repeat the analysis in Table 4 except 
that we augment Eq. (5) with portfolio manager or fund family fixed effects. In particular, in columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) of both panels, we present the estimation 
results of Eq. (5) with portfolio manager fixed effects using the sample of portfolio managers who manage multiple funds simultaneously. In columns (3), (4), (7), 
and (8) of both panels, we add family fixed effects as additional control variables. For the sake of brevity, we only report the coefficient estimates of the main 
variables of interest, although all control variables from Table 2 are included. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level. The superscripts ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Convex vs. Non-Convex Flow-Performance Relation 
  Across-Year Risk Changet  Intra-Year Risk Changet 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
              
Ownership Dummyt-1×Convex -0.234***  -0.259***   -0.420***  -0.279***  
 (-3.11)  (-3.55)   (-3.88)  (-2.76)  
Ownership Dummyt-1×Non-Convex -0.050  -0.099   -0.021  -0.065  
 (-0.72)  (-1.56)   (-0.20)  (-0.78)  
Log($Ownership)t-1×Convex  -0.019***  -0.024***   -0.032***  -0.024*** 
  (-3.15)  (-4.24)   (-3.66)  (-3.11) 
Log($Ownership)t-1×Non-Convex  -0.004  -0.009*   -0.002  -0.006 
  (-0.73)  (-1.72)   (-0.19)  (-0.94) 
Convex 0.212*** 0.213*** 0.079 0.104  0.360*** 0.345*** 0.075 0.087 
 (3.25) (3.25) (1.04) (1.41)  (3.64) (3.52) (0.71) (0.83) 
          
Controls t-1 Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Objective & Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Manager FEs Yes Yes No No  Yes Yes No No 
Family FEs No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
Observations 9,247 9,247 7,063 7,063  9,247 9,247 7,063 7,063 
Adj. R-Squared 0.266 0.266 0.259 0.259  0.329 0.329 0.318 0.318 





Panel B: Whether Fund Past Performance is in the Bottom Quartile (Loser) 
  Across-Year Risk Changet  Intra-Year Risk Changet 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
              
Ownership Dummyt-1× Loser -0.633***  -0.449***   -0.928***  -0.570***  
 (-5.39)  (-4.11)   (-5.13)  (-3.77)  
Ownership Dummyt-1×Non- Loser -0.031  -0.088*   -0.014  -0.048  
 (-0.54)  (-1.66)   (-0.18)  (-0.71)  
Log($Ownership)t-1× Loser  -0.053***  -0.039***   -0.076***  -0.052*** 
  (-5.51)  (-4.64)   (-5.12)  (-4.44) 
Log($Ownership)t-1×Non- Loser  -0.003  -0.008*   -0.001  -0.004 
  (-0.66)  (-1.84)   (-0.15)  (-0.79) 
Loser 1.055*** 1.061*** 0.396** 0.425***  0.837*** 0.835*** 0.474** 0.535*** 
 (5.31) (5.35) (2.49) (2.70)  (3.50) (3.50) (2.50) (2.84) 
          
Controls t-1 Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Objective & Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Manager FEs Yes Yes No No  Yes Yes No No 
Family FEs No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
Observations 10,955 10,955 8,269 8,269  10,955 10,955 8,269 8,269 
Adj. R-Squared 0.272 0.272 0.241 0.242  0.342 0.342 0.306 0.307 









Additional Proxies for Risk-Taking Incentives  
 
In this table, we examine the interaction effects between two alternative proxies of agency-induced risk-taking 
incentives and the effect of portfolio manager ownership on risk changes. These proxies of risk-taking incentives 
include dummy variables indicating (1) whether an individual portfolio manager’s compensation is explicitly linked 
fund performance with an evaluation period greater than one year (Panel A), and (2) whether fund managers have 
above-median or below industry experience of all fund managers (Panel B). For the sake of brevity, we only report the 
coefficient estimates of the main variables of interest, although all control variables from Table 2 are included. 
Standard errors are clustered at the fund level. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Whether Portfolio Manager’s Compensation is based on Long-term Fund Performance  
 Across-Year Risk Changet  Intra-Year Risk Changet 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
          
Ownership Dummyt-1× L.T. Perf. Pay -0.047   -0.096  
 
(-0.71)   (-1.17)  
Ownership Dummyt-1×Non-L.T. Perf. Pay -0.511***   -0.572***  
 
(-3.52)   (-3.50)  
Log($Ownership)t-1× Perf. Pay  -0.008   -0.013** 
  (-1.62)   (-2.04) 
Log($Ownership)t-1× Non-L.T. Perf. Pay  -0.039***   -0.044*** 
  (-3.49)   (-3.55) 
L.T. Perf. Pay -0.473*** -0.435***  -0.431** -0.393** 
 (-3.13) (-2.89)  (-2.45) (-2.26) 
      
Controls t-1 Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Objective& Year FEs Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 6,081 6,081  6,081 6,081 
Adj. R-Squared 0.151 0.152  0.241 0.242 












Panel B: Above-Median vs. Below-Median Industry Experience 
 Across-Year Risk Changet  Intra-Year Risk Changet 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
          
Ownership Dummyt-1×Long Experience -0.174***   -0.235***  
 
(-2.86)   (-3.23)  
Ownership Dummyt-1×Short Experience -0.455***   -0.519***  
 
(-5.39)   (-5.68)  
Log($Ownership)t-1×Long Experience  -0.015***   -0.020*** 
  (-3.30)   (-3.59) 
Log($Ownership)t-1×Short Experience  -0.039***   -0.046*** 
  (-5.90)   (-6.38) 
Long Experience -0.340*** -0.350***  -0.362*** -0.387*** 
 (-3.72) (-3.89)  (-3.62) (-3.92) 
      
Controls t-1 Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Objective& Year FEs Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 8,269 8,269  8,269 8,269 
Adj. R-Squared 0.151 0.153  0.267 0.269 





Portfolio Manager Ownership and the Level of Fund Risk Exposures 
 
This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of Eq. (6) on the relation between portfolio manager ownership and the level of fund risk exposures. 
The regressions are specified as in Eq. (6). All dependent and independent variables are defined as in Table 1. We control for investment objective and year fixed 
effects in the regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively.  
 
 Fund Return Std. Dev.t  Market Betat  Downside Betat 
VARIABLES (1) (2)   (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
                 
Ownership Dummyt-1 -0.3561***   -0.0120***   -0.0129**  
 
(-2.74)   (-2.84)   (-2.49)  
Log($Ownership)t-1  -0.0292***   -0.0011***   -0.0011*** 
 
 (-2.86)   (-3.17)   (-2.65) 
Cum.12-Month Rett-1 -0.0195* -0.0194*  0.0005*** 0.0005***  0.0021*** 0.0021*** 
 
(-1.83) (-1.82)  (3.22) (3.24)  (10.23) (10.25) 
Log Fund Sizet-1 -0.0349 -0.0273  -0.0033* -0.0030  -0.0021 -0.0018 
 
(-0.71) (-0.55)  (-1.80) (-1.61)  (-0.94) (-0.79) 
Log Fund Aget-1 0.0914 0.0879  0.0023 0.0023  -0.0011 -0.0012 
 
(0.77) (0.74)  (0.60) (0.59)  (-0.23) (-0.25) 
Expenset-1 -0.2683 -0.2692  -0.0148** -0.0148**  -0.0112 -0.0112 
 
(-1.51) (-1.52)  (-2.45) (-2.45)  (-1.53) (-1.53) 
Log Turnovert-1 0.3497*** 0.3467***  0.0222*** 0.0220***  0.0287*** 0.0286*** 
 
(3.80) (3.77)  (7.97) (7.94)  (8.50) (8.48) 
Net Flowt-1 -0.0525*** -0.0526***  -0.0019*** -0.0019***  -0.0033*** -0.0033*** 
 
(-2.99) (-2.99)  (-3.58) (-3.59)  (-4.58) (-4.58) 
Fund Activenesst-1 0.1168*** 0.1165***  -0.0038*** -0.0038***  -0.0042*** -0.0042*** 
 
(6.90) (6.89)  (-13.66) (-13.72)  (-11.93) (-11.97) 
Teamt-1 -0.1528 -0.1437  -0.0014 -0.0011  -0.0089 -0.0086 
 
(-1.06) (-1.00)  (-0.32) (-0.24)  (-1.61) (-1.54) 
Log Mgr. Tenuret-1 0.0022 0.0135  0.0001 0.0006  0.0052 0.0057* 
 
(0.03) (0.16)  (0.04) (0.25)  (1.64) (1.78) 




(4.07) (4.02)  (5.16) (5.07)  (4.51) (4.45) 
Constant 34.5766*** 34.4708***  0.8568*** 0.8524***  0.7535*** 0.7493*** 
 
(30.45) (30.17)  (23.07) (22.91)  (16.86) (16.70) 
      
 
  Objective & Year FEs Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 8,269 8,269  8,269 8,269  8,269 8,269 

















Robustness Tests ─ Excluding Funds with TNA below $5 Million or Ownership above $1M.  
 
In this table, we repeat the analysis in Table 2 except that we exclude funds with TNA below $5 million, instead of 
$15 million, in Panel A, and we exclude funds with manager ownership above $1 million in Panel B. For the sake of 
brevity, we only report the coefficient estimates of the main variables of interest. Standard errors are clustered at the 
fund level. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Excluding Funds with TNA below $5 Million 
 
 Across-Year Risk Changet  Intra-Year Risk Changet 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
            
Ownership Dummyt-1 -0.312***   -0.371***  
 
(-5.62)   (-5.99)  
Log($Ownership)t-1  -0.027***   -0.371*** 
 
 (-6.21)   (-5.99) 
      
Controls t-1 Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Objective & Year FEs Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 8,713 8,713  8,713 8,713 




Panel B: Excluding Funds with Ownership above $1 Million 
 
 Across-Year Risk Changet  Intra-Year Risk Changet 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
            
Ownership Dummyt-1 -0.287***   -0.323***  
 
(-4.98)   (-4.95)  
Log($Ownership)t-1  -0.025***   -0.029*** 
 
 (-5.38)   (-5.39) 
      
Controls t-1 Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Objective & Year FEs Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 6,149 6,149  6,149 6,149 




Robustness Tests ─ Alternative Measures of Portfolio Manager Ownership or Risk 
Changes 
 
This table tabulates the results of the robustness tests on alternative proxies for managerial ownership or risk 
changes. In Panel A, we repeat the analysis in Table 2 using alternative measures of risk changes: (i) 24-Month 
Across-Year Risk Change which estimates the across-year risk change measure using 24 monthly returns; and (ii) 
Intra-Year Risk Ratio which is computed as the ratio, rather than the difference, of intended portfolio risk in the 
second half of the year and the realized portfolio risk in the first half of the year. In Panel B, we repeat the analysis 
in Table 2 using alternative measures of portfolio manager ownership. These alternative measures include: (i) 
Ownership Rank, which is set to one if $Ownership falls in the range of $0, and two, three, four, five, six, and seven, 
if it falls in the range of $1–$10,000, $10,001–50,000, $50,001–$100,000, $100,001–$500,000, $500,001–
$1,000,000, and above $1,000,000, respectively; (ii)Log(Mean $Ownership), the logarithm of $Ownership divided 
by the number of portfolio managers in a fund; (iii) %Ownership, the percentage of $Ownership over funds’ total net 
assets. For the sake of brevity, we only report the coefficient estimates of the main variables of interest, although all 
control variables from Table 2 are included. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level. The superscripts ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Alternative Measures of Across-Year and Intra-Year Risk Changes 
 24-Month Across-Year Risk Changet  Intra-Year Risk Change Ratiot 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
            
Ownership Dummyt-1 -0.223***   -0.024***  
 
(-4.48)   (-5.82)  
Log($Ownership)t-1  -0.019***   -0.002*** 
 
 (-4.80)   (-6.36) 
      
Controls t-1 Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Objective & Year FEs Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 8,269 8,269  8,269 8,269 





Panel B: Alternative Measures of Managerial Ownership 
 Across-Year Risk Changet  Intra-Year Risk Change Ratiot 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
               
Ownership Rankt-1 -0.072***    -0.086***   
 
(-6.25)    (-6.76)   
Log(Mean $Ownership)t-1  -0.028***    -0.033***  
 
 (-5.91)    (-6.29)  
%Ownership t-1   -0.079**    -0.106** 
 
  (-2.34)    (-2.42) 
        
Controls t-1 Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Objective& Year FEs Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,269 8,269 8,269  8,269 8,269 8,269 





Robustness Tests ─ Year-by-Year Estimation 
 
This table tabulates the results of year-by-year estimation of Eq. (4). We use the same specification as in Table 2 except that we do not control for year fixed 
effects in the regression. To save space, we report only the coefficients on the variable of interest. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level. The superscripts 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Managerial Ownership and Across-Year Risk Changes 
  Across-Year Risk Changet 
VARIABLES 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
               
Panel A1. Regressions using Ownership Dummy 
Ownership Dummyt-1 -0.349*** -0.402* -0.359*** -0.465*** -0.126 -0.158*** -0.258*** -0.109 
 
(-3.27) (-1.83) (-3.78) (-6.11) (-1.31) (-2.83) (-3.31) (-0.97) 
         
Panel A2. Regressions using Log($Ownership) 
Log($Ownership)t-1 -0.028*** -0.038** -0.030*** -0.039*** -0.010 -0.014*** -0.025*** -0.009 
 
(-3.40) (-2.19) (-4.03) (-6.58) (-1.36) (-3.15) (-4.08) (-1.01) 
 
 
Panel B: Managerial Ownership and Intra-Year Risk Changes 
  Intra-Year Risk Changet 
VARIABLES 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
               
Panel B1. Regressions using Ownership Dummy 
Ownership Dummyt-1 -0.273* -0.498 -0.302*** -0.325*** -0.245** -0.176** -0.515*** -0.285** 
 
(-1.91) (-1.55) (-2.62) (-3.99) (-2.30) (-2.36) (-3.36) (-2.51) 
 
        
Panel B2. Regressions using Log($Ownership) 
Log($Ownership)t-1 -0.022** -0.047* -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.020** -0.015*** -0.045*** -0.021** 
 




Robustness Tests ─ Subsample Analysis 
 
This table reports the subsample analysis on the relation between managerial ownership and fund risk taking. We 
divide our sample into subsamples using team fund dummy and the median fund size, fund flows, turnover ratio, 
fund activeness (1−R-squared), active share, or expense ratio as the cutoff. We repeat the analysis in Table 2 over 
each of the subsamples. To save space, we report only the coefficients on the variable of interest. Standard errors are 
clustered at the fund level. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
   Dep. Var.= Across-Year Risk Changet Dep. Var.=Intra-Year Risk Changet 
Subsamples Ownership Dummyt-1 Log($Ownership)t-1 Ownership Dummyt-1 Log($Ownership)t-1 
           
(1) Team -0.230*** -0.021*** -0.298*** -0.027*** 
 
 
(-3.58) (-4.31) (-3.97) (-4.74) 
(2) Solo -0.445*** -0.035*** -0.441*** -0.035*** 
 
 
(-4.62) (-4.53) (-4.07) (-4.08) 
(3) High Fund Size -0.365*** -0.031*** -0.398*** -0.035*** 
  (-4.17) (-4.77) (-4.15) (-4.90) 
(4) Low Fund Size -0.256*** -0.022*** -0.300*** -0.025*** 
 
 
(-3.63) (-3.86) (-3.63) (-3.81) 
(5) High Net Flows -0.387*** -0.032*** -0.412*** -0.035*** 
 
 
(-4.71) (-4.94) (-4.55) (-5.02) 
(6) Low Net Flows -0.230*** -0.021*** -0.303*** -0.027*** 
 
 
(-3.62) (-4.29) (-3.75) (-4.26) 
(7) High Turnover -0.207*** -0.017*** -0.242*** -0.021*** 
 
 
(-3.28) (-3.38) (-3.18) (-3.53) 
(8) Low Turnover -0.325*** -0.029*** -0.395*** -0.034*** 
 
 
(-3.73) (-4.50) (-4.16) (-4.84) 
(9) High(1-R2) -0.197*** -0.015*** -0.224*** -0.018*** 
 
 
(-3.67) (-3.61) (-2.93) (-2.98) 
(10) Low(1-R2) -0.194*** -0.019*** -0.306*** -0.028*** 
  (-2.58) (-3.21) (-3.64) (-4.36) 
(11) High Active Share -0.206*** -0.017*** -0.226** -0.020*** 
  (-2.91) (-2.96) (-2.50) (-2.87) 
(12) Low Active Share -0.194*** -0.017*** -0.289*** -0.024*** 
  (-2.71) (-3.10) (-3.40) (-3.65) 
(13) High Expense -0.208*** -0.019*** -0.263*** -0.024*** 
  (-3.01) (-3.30) (-3.15) (-3.66) 
(14) Low Expense -0.312*** -0.027*** -0.391*** -0.033*** 








Robustness Tests ─ Control for Performance Rank 
 
In this table, we repeat the analysis in Table 2 except that, following Kempf, Ruenzi and Thiele (2009), we control 
for the percentile ranking of fund performance instead of the return and we control for family fixed effects. Ranks 
are calculated for each investment objective and each year. They are based on cumulative raw returns and are 
normalized to be distributed between zero and one. To save space, we report only the coefficients on the variable of 
interest. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
 
 
 Across-Year Risk Changet  Intra-Year Risk Changet 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
            
Ownership Dummyt-1 -0.192***   -0.186***  
 
(-3.68)   (-2.71)  
Log($Ownership)t-1  -0.016***   -0.017*** 
 
 (-3.95)   (-3.09) 
Cum.6-Month Ret Rank.t    -0.321*** -0.322*** 
    (-3.45) (-3.46) 
Cum.12-Month Ret. Rankt-1 -0.125** -0.124**  -0.360*** -0.359*** 
 
(-2.10) (-2.08)  (-3.96) (-3.95) 
      
Firm FEs Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Objective & Year FEs Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Observations 8,269 8,269 
 
8,269 8,269 















Robustness Tests ─ Control for Additional Manager Characteristics and Family Policies 
 
In this table, we represent the results of several robustness tests on the relation between portfolio manager ownership 
and risk changes. We repeat the analysis in Table 2 except we control for manager compensation structure in Panel 
A, and add several additional control variables on manager characteristics in Panel B. In particular, in Panel A, we 
control for (i) performance advisory fee dummy (Elton, Gruber and Blake, 2003), (ii) Coles Inventive Rate (Coles, 
Suay, and Woodbury, 2000; Massa and Patgiri, 2009), and (iii) dummy variables that set to one if portfolio manager 
compensation is tied to fund performance, AUM, advisor profits, or fixed salary, and zero otherwise (Ma, Tang, and 
Gómez, 2016). In Panel B, we control for the following variables: (i) the SAT score of managers’ undergraduate 
institutions, (ii) whether the manager has an MBA degree, and (iii) a dummy variable that is set to one if any of the 
portfolio managers is a female and zero otherwise. In Panel C, we exclude the sample funds where all or none of 
fund managers in the fund family co-invest in the fund. For the sake of brevity, we only report the coefficient 
estimates of the main variables of interest. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level. The superscripts ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
     
Panel A:  Controlling for Individual Portfolio Manager Compensation Contracts 
 Across-Year Risk Changet  Intra-Year Risk Changet 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
            
Ownership Dummyt-1 -0.184***   -0.235***  
 
(-2.94)   (-3.18)  
Log($Ownership)t-1  -0.017***   -0.022*** 
 
 (-3.55)   (-3.85) 
Perf. Adv. Fee t-1 -0.332 -0.328  0.188 0.193 
 (-1.37) (-1.35)  (0.83) (0.85) 
Coles Incentive Rate t-1 0.286** 0.278**  0.269* 0.259* 
 (2.53) (2.48)  (1.88) (1.81) 
Perf. Pay t-1 -0.295*** -0.295***  -0.292*** -0.293*** 
 (-3.51) (-3.53)  (-3.11) (-3.13) 
AUM Pay t-1 0.010 0.014  0.067 0.071 
 (0.18) (0.24)  (0.97) (1.04) 
Profit Pay t-1 -0.086 -0.083  -0.079 -0.076 
 (-1.50) (-1.47)  (-1.22) (-1.18) 
Fix Pay t-1 -0.228* -0.228*  0.024 0.024 
 (-1.74) (-1.73)  (0.12) (0.12) 
      
Controls t-1 Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Objective & Year FEs Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 6,081 6,081  6,081 6,081 
Adj. R-Squared 0.148 0.149  0.240 0.241 
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Panel B:  Controlling for Manager Education Background 
 Across-Year Risk Changet  Intra-Year Risk Changet 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
            
Ownership Dummyt-1 -0.264***   -0.345***  
 
(-4.05)   (-4.67)  
Log($Ownership)t-1  -0.024***   -0.030*** 
 
 (-4.77)   (-5.30) 
SAT/100 0.042* 0.044*  -0.023 -0.021 
 (1.84) (1.90)  (-0.82) (-0.76) 
MBA (Dummy) 0.077 0.080  -0.081 -0.076 
 (1.26) (1.33)  (-1.12) (-1.05) 
Female (Dummy) -0.028 -0.028  -0.044 -0.044 
 (-0.49) (-0.50)  (-0.68) (-0.68) 
Controls t-1 Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Objective & Year FEs Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 5,995 5,995  5,995 5,995 




Panel C: Excluding Cases Where All or None of Managers in the Fund Family Co-Invest 
 
 Across-Year Risk Changet  Intra-Year Risk Changet 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
            
Ownership Dummyt-1 -0.207***   -0.233***  
 
(-3.28)   (-3.11)  
Log($Ownership)t-1  -0.019***   -0.021*** 
 
 (-3.73)   (-3.58) 
      
Controls t-1 Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Objective & Year FEs Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 4,746 4,746  4,746 4,746 










Alternative Proxies of Risk-Taking Incentives 
 
In this table, we repeat the analysis in Table 4 using alternative proxies for risk-taking incentives. These alternative 
proxies are: (i) whether a fund’s flow-performance relation is convex or not based on regression instead of 
correlation (Panel A), (ii) whether fund age is smaller than or equal to 5 years or above 5 years (Panel B), (iii) 
whether fund family is below or above median value, (iv) whether a fund is a loser fund that underperforming its 
peers based on past 12-month return in column (1) and (2) and first 6-month return in year t in column (3) and (4) 
(Panel D), (v) whether managers’ age are above or below the median of all fund managers (Panel E). For the sake of 
brevity, we only report the coefficient estimates of the main variables of interest. Standard errors are clustered at the 
fund level. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Alternative Convexity Measure of Flow-Performance Relation 
 Across-Year Risk Changet  Intra-Year Risk Changet 
VARIABLES (1) (3) 
 
(4) (6) 
          
Ownership Dummyt-1×Convex -0.348***   -0.455***  
 
(-3.97)   (-4.71)  
Ownership Dummyt-1×Non-Convex -0.216***   -0.226***  
 
(-3.74)   (-3.13)  
Log($Ownership)t-1× Convex  -0.031***   -0.039*** 
  (-4.60)   (-5.25) 
Log($Ownership)t-1× Non-Convex  -0.019***   -0.020*** 
  (-4.19)   (-3.66) 
Convex 0.117 0.137*  0.154 0.170* 
 (1.44) (1.73)  (1.55) (1.74) 
      
Controls t-1 Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Objective& Year FEs Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 7,252 7,252  7,252 7,252 
Adj. R-Squared 0.154 0.156  0.271 0.272 







Panel B: Fund Age: Younger vs. Order Funds 
 Across-Year Risk Changet  Intra-Year Risk Changet 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
          
Ownership Dummyt-1× Younger Funds -0.755***   -1.043***  
 
(-3.48)   (-3.88)  
Ownership Dummyt-1× Older Funds -0.293***   -0.332***  
 
(-5.08)   (-5.25)  
Log($Ownership)t-1× Younger Funds  -0.061***   -0.088*** 
  (-3.63)   (-4.27) 
Log($Ownership)t-1× Older Funds  -0.025***   -0.029*** 
  (-5.60)   (-5.80) 
Younger Funds 0.083 0.078  0.201 0.228 
 (0.46) (0.44)  (0.98) (1.13) 
      
Controls t-1 Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Objective& Year FEs Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 8,269 8,269  8,269 8,269 
Adj. R-Squared 0.150 0.151  0.267 0.268 





Panel C: Above- vs. Below-Median Family Size 
 Across-Year Risk Changet  Intra-Year Risk Changet 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
          
Ownership Dummyt-1×Big Family -0.240***   -0.340***  
 
(-3.07)   (-3.89)  
Ownership Dummyt-1×Small Family -0.398***   -0.386***  
 
(-4.89)   (-4.23)  
Log($Ownership)t-1× Big Family  -0.022***   -0.030*** 
  (-3.59)   (-4.48) 
Log($Ownership)t-1× Small Family  -0.033***   -0.033*** 
  (-5.20)   (-4.66) 
Big Family 0.060 0.063  0.180 0.179 
 (0.55) (0.58)  (1.43) (1.44) 
      
Controls t-1 Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Objective& Year FEs Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 8,269 8,269  8,269 8,269 
Adj. R-Squared 0.150 0.151  0.267 0.268 
F-Tests (P-value) 0.156 0.184  0.714 0.763 
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Panel D: Alternative Ways of Defining Loser Funds 
 Across-Year Risk Changet  Intra-Year Risk Changet 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
          
Ownership Dummyt-1×Loser -0.449***   -0.260***  
 
(-3.46)   (-2.95)  
Ownership Dummyt-1×Non-Loser -0.269***   -0.074  
 
(-5.33)   (-0.84)  
Log($Ownership)t-1× Loser  -0.040***   -0.022*** 
  (-4.04)   (-3.19) 
Log($Ownership)t-1× Non-Loser  -0.023***   -0.008 
  (-5.76)   (-1.21) 
Loser 0.037 0.063  0.500*** 0.492*** 
 (0.31) (0.55)  (4.27) (4.25) 
      
Controls t-1 Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Objective& Year FEs Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 8,269 8,269  8,269 8,269 
Adj. R-Squared 0.150 0.151  0.321 0.321 





Panel E: Above- vs. Below-Median Portfolio Manager Age 
 Across-Year Risk Changet  Intra-Year Risk Changet 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
          
Ownership Dummyt-1×Older Mgr. -0.180***   -0.271***  
 
(-2.83)   (-3.50)  
Ownership Dummyt-1×Younger Mgr. -0.438***   -0.549***  
 
(-4.62)   (-5.38)  
Log($Ownership)t-1× Older Mgr.  -0.017***   -0.023*** 
  (-3.40)   (-3.98) 
Log($Ownership)t-1× Younger Mgr.  -0.037***   -0.047*** 
  (-5.17)   (-6.05) 
Older Mgr. -0.226** -0.230**  -0.287*** -0.298*** 
 (-2.29) (-2.39)  (-2.61) (-2.78) 
      
Controls t-1 Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Objective& Year FEs Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 7,508 7,508  7,508 7,508 
Adj. R-Squared 0.158 0.160  0.278 0.279 








Risk-Taking Incentives and the Impact of Ownership: Alternative Ownership Measures 
 
This table reports the results of robustness tests on the risk-taking incentives and the impact of ownership on risk changes. In Panel A (B), we repeat the analysis 
in Table 4 Panel A (B) using alternative measures of portfolio manager ownership. These alternative measures include: (i) Ownership Rank, which is set to one if 
$Ownership falls in the range of $0, and two, three, four, five, six, and seven, if it falls in the range of $1–$10,000, $10,001–50,000, $50,001–$100,000, 
$100,001–$500,000, $500,001–$1,000,000, and above $1,000,000, respectively; (ii)Log(Mean $Ownership), the logarithm of $Ownership divided by the number 
of portfolio managers in a fund; (iii) %Ownership, the percentage of $Ownership over funds’ total net assets. For the sake of brevity, we only report the 
coefficient estimates of the main variables of interest, although all control variables from Table 4 are included. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level. The 
superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Convex vs. Non-Convex Flow-Performance Relation  
 Across-Year Risk Changet  Intra-Year Risk Change Ratiot 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
               
Ownership Rankt-1×Convex -0.102***    -0.113***   
 (-6.40)    (-6.09)   
Ownership Rankt-1×Non-Convex -0.034***    -0.041***   
 (-2.84)    (-2.83)   
Log(Mean $Ownership)t-1×Convex  -0.039***    -0.045***  
  (-5.63)    (-5.57)  
Log(Mean $Ownership)t-1×Non-Convex  -0.013**    -0.014**  
  (-2.56)    (-2.42)  
%Ownership t-1×Convex   -0.121**    -0.100 
   (-2.46)    (-1.50) 
%Ownership t-1×Non-Convex   0.008    -0.010 
   (0.19)    (-0.20) 
Convex 0.344*** 0.282*** 0.086**  0.291*** 0.247** 0.007 
 (4.03) (3.55) (2.04)  (2.63) (2.42) (0.12) 
        
Controls t-1 Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Objective& Year FEs Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,063 7,063 7,063  7,063 7,063 7,063 
Adj. R-Squared 0.160 0.158 0.151  0.273 0.273 0.268 
F-Tests (P-value) 0.000 0.000 0.038  0.001 0.001 0.234 
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Panel B: Whether Fund Past Performance is in the Bottom Quartile (Loser) 
  Across-Year Risk Shiftt  Intra-Year Risk Shiftt 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
              
Ownership Rankt-1×Loser -0.136***    -0.183***   
 
(-6.02)    (-5.98)   
Ownership Rankt-1×Non-Loser -0.053***    -0.058***   
 
(-4.61)    (-4.70)   
Log(Mean $Ownership)t-1×Loser  -0.052***    -0.066***  
 
 (-5.66)    (-5.31)  
Log(Mean $Ownership)t-1×Non-Loser  -0.021***    -0.023***  
  (-4.26)    (-4.45)  
%Ownership t-1×Loser   -0.325***    -0.445*** 
   (-4.51)    (-3.94) 
%Ownership t-1×Non-Loser   0.028    0.028 
   (0.90)    (0.76) 
Loser 
 
0.434** 0.367** 0.186  0.535** 0.390* 0.124 
 (2.48) (2.15) (1.21)  (2.52) (1.95) (0.73) 
        
Controls t-1 Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Objective& Year FEs Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,269 8,269 8,269  8,269 8,269 8,269 
Adj. R-Squared 0.152 0.151 0.147  0.268 0.267 0.265 




Alternative Measures of Fund Risk Exposures 
 
This table reports the estimation results of Eq. (6) using alternative measures of fund risk exposures. These 
alternative measures in Panel A are (i) factor loading on the SMB (size) factor (column 1−2), (ii) the HML (book-to-
market) factor (column 3−4), and (iii) the UMD (momentum) factor (column 5−6). In Panel B, we use fund total risk 
(i.e., annualized standard deviation of fund returns) constructed using weekly data (column 1−2), and market beta 
estimated using weekly data (column 3−4). In Panel C, we use fund co-skewness, constructed using daily return data 
as in Harvey and Siddique (2000) and Ang, Chen, and Xing (2006). We control for the same set of variables as in 
Table 7 and cluster the standard errors at the fund level. For the sake of brevity, we only report the coefficient 
estimates of the main variables of interest. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Fund Betas on SMB, HML, and UMD Factors 
 SMB Betat  HML Betat  UMD Betat 
VARIABLES (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
                  

























         
Controls t-1 Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Objective & Year FEs Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 8,269 8,269  8,269 8,269  8,269 8,269 




Panel B: Fund Risk Variables Based on Weekly Returns 
 Fund Return Std. Dev.t (Weekly)  Market Betat (Weekly) 
VARIABLES (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
            

















      
Controls t-1 Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Objective & Year FEs Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 8,269 8,269  8,269 8,269 
Adj. R-Squared 0.871 0.871  0.356 0.356 
 
Panel C: Co-skewness 
 Co-skewnesst 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
      









   
Controls t-1 Yes Yes 
Objective & Year FEs Yes Yes 
Observations 8,269 8,269 
Adjusted R-squared 0.922 0.922 
 
 
 
